Wednesday, April 23, 2014
By SETH BORENSTEIN and DINA CAPPIELLO
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON - The BP oil rig explosion and spill wasn't about anyone purposely sacrificing safety for money, investigators on a special presidential commission said Monday. Instead it was more about seemingly acceptable risks adding up to disaster.
Fred H. Bartlit Jr., the chief attorney of a commission looking into the BP spill, says ”human beings did not sit there and sell safety down the river for dollars ...”
The Associated Press
Investigators at the commission's hearing outlined more than a dozen decisions that at the time seemed questionable but also explainable. It was how those cascaded and crashed together that fueled catastrophe.
Yet there was no evidence of a conscious decision on the BP rig to do things on the cheap at the expense of safety, investigators stressed several times. Likewise, representatives of the companies involved in the disaster denied that corners were cut because of cost.
Critics -- including a top academic, a congressman and people on the polluted Bayou -- are balking at what they see as something close to a free pass for BP's history of cost cutting. In the first nonpolitical and independent investigation of the disaster, commission officials say they aren't excusing BP at all, but pointing out there was no clear single decision that came down solely to money.
"Anytime you are talking about a million and a half dollars a day, money enters in. All I am saying is human beings did not sit there and sell safety down the river for dollars on the rig that night," said commission chief attorney Fred H. Bartlit Jr.
That doesn't mean that a general culture of cost cutting wasn't an issue, added commission co-chairman Bob Graham, the former Florida senator and governor. Graham wrapped up the day by saying he was worried that there was "a compulsion to get this rig completed in that April 19-April 20 timetable."
And panel co-chairman William K. Reilly said in an interview after the hearing that BP does deserve a good share of blame: "A lot of the key decisions were in fact made by BP." He said that while it might look as if the commission wasn't concerned about the culture of cost cutting at BP, it will address that broader corporate problem in the future.
Halliburton Co., which had the crucial job of cementing the well, was on the hot seat as much as BP on Monday, clashing more often with investigators than the oil company. And the commission still hasn't dealt with the blowout preventer, a key instrument, because it is still being examined.
Bartlit, the panel's chief investigator, revealed in a letter last month that testing on cement mixtures similar to those used in the well showed that the formula was unstable before the blowout, but BP and Halliburton used it anyway. Bartlit said the companies should have reconsidered the type of cement used in the well. Cement is an essential barrier to preventing blowouts.
Led by commission investigators, BP Vice President Mark Bly said Halliburton officials were slow about testing and results.
Not everyone agrees that small decisions along the way led to the disaster. One of the nation's top technological disaster academics said the spill commission was a "cover-up" from the White House. Charles Perrow, a Yale University professor who wrote the disaster sociology classic "Normal Accidents" said the investigation was overlooking BP's track record of disasters that have come after cost cutting.
"There's a long history of dollars versus safety at this organization," Perrow said in a telephone interview with The Associated Press. He referred specifically to BP's 2005 Texas City oil refinery explosion in which federal officials cited a culture of cost cutting at the expense of safety. In 2006, BP's lack of leak detection caused a massive pipeline spill, the largest on Alaska's North Slope to date.
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