In the Jan. 3 opinion piece, “Secretary Bellows begs to differ. Would that it were so simple,” attorney Gregory S. Fryer leans heavily on an 1869 opinion by Justice Samuel Chase to question the secretary of state’s disqualification of Donald Trump from Maine ballots. While his concern for how Bellows’ decision creates “calamitous uncertainties” and threatens “cherished constitutional protections of personal liberty” is reasonable, Fryer overlooks disputes and contexts about what Chase did.

For one, Chase used opposite interpretations for different individuals. As legal scholar Gerard Magliocca points out, the result was that Chase “applied the text to help the ex-Confederate President and not to help freed slaves.”

Moreover, Chase was generally hostile to the 14th Amendment, and his views were at odds with what the drafters of the amendment believed. Professor Mark Graber, a preeminent scholar of the 14th Amendment, notes that “Chase repeatedly urged Republicans to drop Section 3 entirely (he also had little use for Section 1). His letters described Section 3 as ‘overloading the ship with amendment freight” and “unnecessary to the main object, reorganization of the Union by the restoration of just terms of the States in rebellion.’”

Third, Graber’s amicus brief submitted to Bellows describes states creating their own procedures to disqualify candidates because they did not want individuals to serve in office whose actions threatened the American republic.

It very well may be that the U.S. Supreme Court agrees with Chase’s position. However, it is indeed not that simple.

Amy Fried
Professor emerita of political science, University of Maine
Bangor

Copy the Story Link